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I. Introduction 
 
A little over a year ago, on June 5th 2013, a former NSA employee caused for 
international public commotion, by leaking secret documents on the surveillance 
practices of the US administration to the national and international press.1  In the 
months that followed, Edward Snowden –the now well-known whistleblower- 
continued to leak secret documents to the press, which revealed how not only the 
USA, but also other Western states (amongst which the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands) partake in large-scale, everyday surveillance practices, both 
domestically and internationally, and amongst allies and enemies alike.2  
 In the media, the most prominent discussion that followed the NSA-leaks 
evolved around a ‘fight’ between two civil liberties: the right to privacy and the right 
to (national) security. This fear for the impairment of one –or several- civil liberties 
immediately sheds light on the complexity of the practice of surveillance.3 State 
surveillance, namely, is often associated with images of the Stasi in the DDR, the 
Orwellian ‘superstate’ Oceania4, or with totalitarian regimes in general. It is often 
forgotten, however, that surveillance is also used by states to constitute and maintain 
those same (and other) civil liberties (Balkin 2008; Morozov 2011: 57-84). Think, for 
example, of the different roles that surveillance plays in the distribution of pensions, 
the creation of safe public spaces, and the use of personalized transportation cards. In 
all of these examples, surveillance is used to enhance rather than impair people’s civil 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 NSA collecting phone records of millions of Verizon customers daily, the Guardian, 
06-06-2013. Source: www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-
verizon-court-order (latest access: 11-06-2014). 
2 The NSA files + Document, the Guardian, June-November 2013, Source: 
www.theguardian.com/world/the-nsa-files+content/document (latest access: 11-06-
2014); NSA monitored calls of 35 world leaders after US official handed over 
contacts, the Guardian, 25-10-2013. Source: 
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/nsa-surveillance-world-leaders-calls (latest 
access: 11-06-2014). 
3 I would argue that this ‘fight’ between privacy and national security is a misleading 
one, as the debate tends to present the notions of privacy and security as rivals, 
assuming a zero-sum game between the two. Instead, I argue, privacy and security 
should not be seen as opposites, but rather as two different interpretations of freedom, 
which are positioned at different sides of the same spectrum. For more information on 
this matter see: Kim Taipale (2005) Technology, Security and Privacy: the Fear of 
Frankenstein, the Mythology of Privacy and the Lessons of King Ludd. In: Yale 
Journal of Law and Technology 7(1), Article 6. 
4 Orwell, G., 1949, Nineteen Eighty-Four. London: Penguin Books. 
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rights, by providing them with social services and security.5 It would be a mistake, 
therefore, to merely perceive surveillance as a state’s tool to dominate and oppress its 
own and/or other country’s people: there are more sides to the practice of 
surveillance.  
 While Snowden’s revelations have not disclosed a new phenomenon –state 
surveillance has a long history- it has, however, revealed the unprecedented scale and 
comprehensiveness of modern surveillance practices in and by Western democratic 
states, and its accompanying consequences. It has been stated that ‘modern 
democracies nowadays have more in-depth knowledge on their population than 
whichever dictatorship has had in the past’.6 Or, in other words, we are living in so-
called ‘surveillance societies’: societies in which surveillance is being conducted on a 
continuous basis, in which it is part of people’s daily life; societies in which the use of 
surveillance is an important organizational practice of the state.7 
 A documentary broadcasted by the Dutch television program Tegenlicht8 at 
the beginning of this year, called het Veiligheidscomplex (‘the Safety Complex’), 
offers an example of the ways in which surveillance has come to play an important 
role in state’s security policies. The documentary specifically portrays how European 
states have increasingly come to make use of surveillance technologies to control 
people’s mobility at –and beyond- the external EU borders. Within a little over a 
decade, the international security industry has grown from 10 billion in 2001 to over 
100 billion a year in 2011, as the relationship between technology and border control 
has developed from the building of actual walls to the creation of new ‘walls’ around 
Europe, which consist of a variety of surveillance, monitoring and security 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Note that these examples do not exclude the element of state control: the state also 
benefits from people’s right to social services, safety on the street and the registration 
of people’s mobility, as will be made clear in this thesis. I argue, however, that 
control should not be equated with full domination, oppression or ‘evil’ state 
conspiracy theories. 
6 Terms and Conditions May Apply, 2013. 
7 Talk by David Lyon, ‘Surveillance Society’, during the Festival del Diritto, in 
Piancenza, Italy, on 28-09-2008. Source: 
www.festivaldeldiritto.it/2008/pdf/interventi/david_lyon.pdf (latest access: 21-10-
2013). 
8 Tegenlicht (‘Backlight’) is a television-documentary program that is weekly 
broadcasted on television by the Dutch broadcasting company VPRO. 
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technologies (for example, the use of camera’s, sensors, drones and/or biometric 
passports).9 
 The building of these walls, which are also referred to as ‘smart borders’, is 
often perceived as being part of an U.S. security strategy that was developed in 
reaction to the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in 2001. The bombings 
of 2004 and 2005 in Madrid and London, consequently, are seen to have further 
encouraged the adoption of this strategy within the EU. The idea of smart borders, 
however, has been a point of discussion long before these attacks took place: it has 
been part of the U.S. immigration debate since the early 1990s, specifically in relation 
to the (illegal) migration issues at the U.S.-Mexico border. In Europe, likewise, the 
issue of smart borders was not primarily addressed due to national security concerns, 
but predominantly on grounds of immigration control (Bigo et al. 2013: 14-15).10 
 International migration has become one of the most prominent issues in states’ 
national security debates, as migration is increasingly being linked with 
(international) terrorism. The terrorist attacks in the 2000s have only helped to 
enhance these pre-existing associations. Consequently, state border control in general 
–and the use of surveillance technologies at borders in specific- has strongly 
expanded (Adamson 2006: 165-166). When looking at the EU’s approach to border 
control, these changes can be seen in the implementation of several surveillance and 
monitoring systems, such as the Schengen Information System’s (SIS I and II), the 
Visa Information System (VIS), and the Frontex Information System –which resulted 
into the foundation of the EU border agency ‘Frontex’ (Bigo et al. 2012: 6).  
 Though each provides a different service, these systems all have two EU 
security objectives in common: ‘...the widespread implementation of surveillance 
technologies and techniques to enhance security, law enforcement and defence 
capabilities in these core “mission areas”...[and secondly, they share] the drive for 
“interoperability”, or the integration of surveillance tools with other government 
information and communications systems...’ (Hayes 2009: 29). European states, in 
other words, have increased the role of surveillance technologies in their own security 
strategies with the aim to integrate these technologies and techniques on a 
supranational level. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Het Veiligheidscomplex, 2014.  
10 Het Veiligheidscomplex, 2014. 
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 This use of surveillance technologies and techniques at state borders, however, 
does not stop at the geographical borderlines of a territory. The registration and 
regulation of people’s movement within and across national boundaries can be seen, 
for example, in the implementation of the personalised, digital public transport card; 
the biometric passport; the tracing and tracking of mobile phones and GPS locations; 
and in the use of number plate recognition technology by tax authorities.11 The state’s 
focus, therefore, can be said to have shifted from border control to a more general 
focus on the control or management of people’s mobility (Pécoud 2013: 1).12  
 Not all people, however, are faced with the same level of surveillance. 
Teenagers in supermarkets, homeless people on the street, mental patients in 
hospitals, and migrants at the border: all these groups face higher levels of 
surveillance, be it in the form of door policies, the installation of CCTV-systems on 
the street, random police check’s on the street or the observation of people in 
specialized institutes. All those that are regarded as being (potential) deviants or as 
‘not-belonging’ are treated as an ‘Other’; and consequently, are subjected to 
intensified surveillance (Walby 2005: 184). It can be questioned, therefore, whether 
and how these various intensity-levels of state surveillance affect people’s right to 
freedom of movement. Therefore, in this thesis, I will critically look at the following 
question: How does the use of surveillance technologies at the border, as conducted 
by the EU, influence people’s degree of mobility?13   
 In doing so, I will look at two recent proposals by the European Council: first, 
the proposed ‘Smart Border Package’, which consists of the Entry/Exit System (EES, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Talk by David Lyon, ‘Surveillance Society’, during the Festival del Diritto, in 
Piancenza, Italy, on 28-09-2008. Source: 
www.festivaldeldiritto.it/2008/pdf/interventi/david_lyon.pdf (latest access: 21-10-
2013); Phew, NSA Is Just Collecting Metadata. (You Should Still Worry), Wired, 19-
06-2013. Source: www.wired.com/2013/06/phew-it-was-just-metadata-not-think-
again (latest access: 12-06-2014); Belastingdienst controleert vaker kentekens, NRC, 
31-07-2013. Source: www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/07/31/belastingdienst-en-politie-
controleren-vaker-kentekens (latest access: 12-06-2014); Het Veiligheidscomplex, 
2014. 
12 Het Veiligheidscomplex, 2014. 
13 Due to the scope of this thesis, I have chosen to solely focus on surveillance that is 
being done by states, rather than incorporating the acts of surveillance by large 
companies. The role of large companies such as Google and Facebook in surveillance 
(either independently or in cooperation with the government), however, should not be 
underestimated. For an informal, yet intriguing introduction to the topic, I strongly 
recommend Cullen Hoback’s documentary ‘Terms and Conditions May Apply’, 2013. 
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considered for implementation) and the Registered Traveller Programme (RTP, 
considered for implementation); and secondly, the EU Border Surveillance System 
(EUROSUR), which has been implemented at the end of 2013 (Bigo et al. 2012: 87-
90).14 Although these proposals have not been (fully) implemented at this moment, 
they do offer important insights into the current and future directive that the EU takes 
towards the issues of surveillance and border control. These two cases will therefore 
function as central examples in my discussion of states’ use of surveillance at the EU 
border.  
 The analysis of these two cases is based on a variety of theoretical material, 
which discusses the main concepts of this research: surveillance, mobility, borders 
and the concept of (state) identity –which has proved to play an important role in 
relation to all of the other concepts mentioned. The literature used in this thesis 
originates from a variety of disciplines, amongst which international studies/relations, 
surveillance studies, anthropology, sociology, security studies and human/political 
geography. One of the most important sources of my research has been The 
Surveillance Studies Reader (edited by Sean Hier and Josh Greenberg, 2007), which 
has provided me with a broad overview on the topic of surveillance, by the most 
influential writers in the field. I feel obligated to mention one of these authors 
separately, as the work of the Canadian sociologist David Lyon has been one of the 
most extensive sources of my research. Likewise, the various articles written by 
political geographer Henk van Houtum have proven to be crucial for the writing of 
this thesis, by enriching my understanding of the issues of borders, migration and 
(national) identity. Finally, the Tegenlicht documentary mentioned earlier, Het 
Veiligheidscomplex, has greatly inspired me in my thinking and understanding of 
these issues, and has provided me with a clear case study during my roaming of the 
theoretical fields of surveillance and security. 
 In the upcoming pages, I will offer a critical overview of the central concepts 
of my research. In doing so, I will give special attention to the processes of ordering, 
bordering and othering that take place at (and beyond) the borderline. I will also 
discuss the history and development of the practice of surveillance, and the different 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Council of the EU (2013), Council adopts regulation establishing the EUROSUR 
system. Brussels, 22-10-2013. Source: 
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/139099.pdf (latest 
access: 08-06-2014). 
	   8	  
ways in which surveillance can be used by states. Finally, I will discuss the various 
socio-political implications of the use of surveillance technology at the border on 
people’s mobility. First of all, however, I will turn to the concepts of borders, identity 
and mobility, in order to get a better understanding of the ways in which a state 
manages and controls its external borderline. 
 
II. Borders & Mobility 
 
In recent decades, several scholars have discussed how states have increasingly come 
to enhance the policing of their external borders.15 This development can be partly 
explained by the globalization of the world, which has incited the rise of transnational 
flows of money, goods, and people. While the movement of capital is often being 
encouraged and facilitated, the movement of people rather faces restrictions (van 
Houtum & van Naerssen 2001: 128-129). These transnational migration flows, 
namely, are considered to challenge the sovereignty, autonomy and national security 
of the state, as they question the traditional territorial organization of the political 
world (Devetak 2005: 182). In other words: transnational movement is considered to 
disrupt the status quo, which has led states to emphasize their boundaries and borders. 
Or, as Nayak and Selbin put it: ‘...the globe is shrinking, but the borders seem to be 
bigger’ (2010: 94).  
 The end of the Cold War, the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington, and 
the terrorist attacks in London and Madrid are believed to have further encouraged the 
state’s strengthening of border control. Immigration, namely, has come to be closely 
linked with the issue of national security, leaving migrants to be framed in terms of 
risk, uncertainty and even criminality: migrants are managed as potential threats. As a 
result, the management of borders has become increasingly restrictive, securitized, 
and even militarized (Adamson 2006: 166, 179; Doty 2007: 123; van Houtum & 
Pijpers 2007: 295). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See, for example, the work of Adamson (2006) Crossing Borders: International 
Migration and National Security. In: International Security 31 (1): 165-199.  
It should be noted, however, that this line of argumentation excludes opposite 
developments, in which states are seen to diminish rather than enhance their level of 
border control. Think, for example, of the opening up of the internal state-borders 
between the various European Member States, which created the Schengen Area (van 
Houtum & Pijpers 2007: 293). 
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 Before I will look more closely at the ways in which the nature of EU border 
management has changed, it is important to get a better understanding of the 
significance of borders and the role that identity plays in border issues. Therefore, I 
will now first discuss the concept of borders, the act of bordering and the 
development of the notion of the so-called ‘borderscape’.  
 
Borders, (B)ordering and Borderscapes 
 
Border control is inherently a matter of identity management, as it presumes a 
constant process of distinguishing between those who are, and those who are not 
considered to ‘belong’ to a specific group. Traditionally speaking, the border has been 
defined as the locus for this decision-making process of a state. When following this 
perspective, the border is solely perceived as the line that symbolically and/or literally 
demarcates a specific territory: the place that distinguishes the internal from the 
external (Anderson 2006 [1973]; Brambilla 2014: 11; Torpey 2000: 63). Therefore, 
the most important task of any sovereign power is the guarding of its borders, as it is 
the place where the sovereign can claim its right to decide who is in and who is out. 
This control on its territorial borders enables the sovereign –amongst others- to 
manage the flow of people, goods and labour; to limit the foreign access to its 
markets; and to sustain its internal security. The right to decide on matters of in- and 
exclusion, therefore, is a defining power of the sovereign state: it is how the state is 
able to constitute itself as being a state (Adamson 2006: 176; Devetak 2005: 174-176; 
Rule 1973: 19-20). 
 To perceive a border just as a demarcation-line and as the sole locus of a 
state’s decision-making process, however, leaves us with a very narrow understanding 
of the concept. Borders should be understood as multiplying and constantly changing: 
they are not only located at the margins of a state’s territory, but can also be 
distinguished in symbolic and ideological ways, such as language, norms, values, 
dress codes, architecture and moral conduct (Devetak 2005: 175; van Houtum 2010: 
290-291; Paasi 2012: 2303-2305). Think, for example, of the burqa and niqab bans in 
countries such as France, the Netherlands and Belgium; or the ban against the 
building of minarets on mosques in Switzerland; or the obligatory integration-
	   10	  
programs for migrants in the Netherlands.16 All these examples represent different 
types of borders, which are located within state-lines. Modern states, in other words, 
do not only constitute their boundaries physically, but also (re)produce and uphold 
their identities in ways that go beyond their geographical state-lines (Anderson 2013: 
2-3; Devetak 2005: 175-178). 
 A border, therefore, should be understood as being inherently political, 
normative and dynamic: as a construction of a specific reality or truth. These truths 
are constructed through the act of bordering: the process through which the inside is 
being internalized and the outside is being excluded (van Houtum 2010: 290). The 
truth that is being (re)constructed in and at borders, however, is only just that: a 
truth/reality, not ‘truth’ itself. Or, to use the concept of the philosopher Jean 
Baudrillard, a border should be seen as a simulacrum: as a simulation of a model of 
reality that is no longer based on a specific interpretation of reality (the ‘really real’), 
but rather has created its own reality. Simulacra should be understood, therefore, as 
constructions of a reality or a truth that have come to precede reality, rather than 
represent it. Such simulacra, however, are often presented as being general truths, 
rather than specifically constructed ones. They can do so with success: simulacrum 
can come to dominate reality, as Baudrillard argues: a simulacrum can be true without 
representing ‘the truth’ (Baudrillard 1988: 166-169; van Houtum 2011: 50). A border, 
therefore, should be understood as a created reality, by which the created inside (that 
what is considered to ‘belong’) and the created outside (what is considered not to 
‘belong’) are true within that specific created reality. 
 The concept of ‘borderscapes’ further enhances this understanding of the 
changing, constructed character of borders. The word ‘scapes’ originates from the 
Dutch/German term scheppen/schaffen, which can be translated as ‘to create’ (van 
Houtum & Spierings 2012: 4). This process of creation can be distinguished in how 
the act of bordering actively changes a ‘neutral’ space into a place: a specific 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The Islamic veil across Europe. Website BBC, 01-07-2014. Source: 
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13038095 (latest access: 04-07-2014); Zwitserland 
stemt voor verbod op bouw minaretten. NRC, 29-11-2009. Source: 
vorige.nrc.nl/buitenland/article2425412.ece/Zwitserland_stemt_voor_verbod_op_bou
w_minaretten (latest access: 04-07-2014); Van cursus tot ceremonie en contract: 
inburgeren in Nederland. De Volkskrant, 20-02-2013. Source: 
www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2686/Binnenland/article/detail/3397114/2013/02/20/Van-
cursus-tot-ceremonie-en-contract-inburgeren-in-Nederland.dhtml (latest access: 04-
07-2014). 
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interpretation of a space. The fact that such a place is being (re)constructed -by 
constantly being (re)bordered- is what offers the space its shape and meaning: the 
space has become a ‘borderscape’ (Brambilla 2014: 10). The concept of borderscapes, 
therefore, is able to further reveal the complex, dynamic socio-spatial relations that 
take place at and across borders, thereby challenging the traditional geopolitical, 
territorial understanding of the concept. Borders, in order words, should be 
understood as standing at the centre of the political sphere, rather than at the margins 
(ibid.: 2,6).  
 One of most important contributions of the concept of borderscapes is its 
insight into the understanding of borders not only as ‘markers of belonging’, but also 
as ‘places of becoming’. The boundaries between belonging and exclusion are 
constantly changing and evolving, thereby functioning as ‘a political tool for ordering 
reality’ (ibid.: 10). Dominant understandings of the meaning and significance of 
boundaries, which Brambilla calls hegemonic borderscapes, are constantly being 
(re)constituted. These hegemonic borderscapes, however, simultaneously offer a 
context in which alternative ideas and practices can evolve and present counter-
hegemonic understandings of boundaries (ibid.: 10-11). The true-ness of the ‘truths’ 
in the self-created realities of borders, therefore, constantly faces the threat of being 
disrupted by the true/truth-making processes of other constructed realities. 
 The ways in which states (re)create distinctions between the internal and the 
external on a supranational level, and how they are able to create such realities of 
trueness, is closely related to the theory of Orientalism, as explained by Edward Said. 
In order to understand the exclusionary processes of bordering and ordering between 
states, therefore, it is now necessary to look at the process of othering. 
 
Othering at the Border 
 
In his work Orientalism (2003 [1977]), Said looks at the ways in which ‘the West’ 
distinguishes itself from ‘the Orient’. He argues that this distinction was used to 
justify the position of the superior Western colonizer/imperialist in relation to the 
colonized Oriental: while ‘the Orient’ was portrayed as irrational, childlike and 
abnormal; the Western dominant discourse presented itself as rational, mature and 
‘normal’. This constructed political vision on reality, which based its hierarchical 
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structure on the distinction between the familiar (‘us’) and the strange (‘them’), is 
what Said has called Orientalism (ibid.: 37-44).  
 The identity politics that underlie this relationship between the familiar and 
the strange, or the Self and the Other, reveal the mutual dependency between such 
categories: the Self can not be without being able to not be the Other; while the Other, 
likewise, needs the Self to be the Self’s Other, and needs a different Other in order to 
be its own Self (Nayak & Malone 2009: 256). Due to the way in which the identity of 
the Other is being constructed and determined by the superior Self, the Other is 
portrayed as that what the Self is not, and does not want to be. Nevertheless, the Other 
presents the Self with a potential danger, as the Other can blur the difference between 
the inside and the outside (van Houtum & Pijpers 2007: 297). Consequently, the 
Other needs to be contained, disciplined, and/or excluded from the realm of the Self. 
The identity of the inferior Other, in other words, is both a necessity of -and a threat 
to- the identity of the Self (Devetak 2005: 117). Moreover, the notion of an external 
Other that threatens the internal Self creates a moral space, in which a specific 
hierarchy of superiority and inferiority is being constituted. The creation of the Other 
as an enemy, more specifically, can be used as a means of justifying possible politico-
military measures taken by the Self towards the Other (Devetak 2005: 176, 178).  
 In order to safeguard their own internal security and national identity, states 
can be seen to make use of this process of othering in order to exclude the Other from 
their inner realm. The state-border is one of the main loci where the distinction is 
made between insiders and outsiders, as it is the place where is decided which 
outsiders are able to gain (temporary) access to the insiders realm. This process of 
othering at the border, in other words, has important consequences on the mobility of 
people.  
 
Mobility at, in, and beyond the Border 
 
Mobility holds the potential to disrupt: counter-hegemonic discourses, after all, are 
able to disturb the existing order and thereby challenge the hegemonic discourse of 
any political unit (Brambilla 2014: 11; Torpey 2000: 58). International and 
transnational movements, consequently, are often regarded as ‘deviant’ processes that 
pose a social and/or a political risk to the status quo and therefore need to be 
regulated and controlled by the state. Identity management at the border, in other 
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words, has turned into an issue of risk assessment (Geiger 2013: 17; Pécoud 2013: 1-
2). In order to make mobility more readable –and thereby more manageable- the state 
makes use of the process of social categorisation, in order to identify the level of risk 
and uncertainty of such ‘mobile people’. As a result, border crossers are being divided 
into categories of  ‘high’ and ‘low’ risk people (Pécoud 2013: 7; Smith 2013: 83, 93).  
 The freedom to move, consequently, is becoming one of the most stratifying 
factors of our time: while some people’s mobility is being enhanced, the majority of 
the people is being confined in their mobility, or have even been made immobile due 
to these processes of categorisation (Bauman 1998: 2-3). This development has an 
enhancing effect on already existing global inequalities, causing for the worsening of 
the position of the marginalized groups, while improving the position of the more 
affluent people (Graham & Wood 2003: 219). The risk of maintaining existing 
marginalities and reinforcing cumulative disadvantages17, therefore, is considered to 
be high (Lyon 2010: 621). Due to the radical and increasing inequality that can be 
discerned in people’s degree of mobility, Bauman argues that a hierarchy of mobility 
is emerging, which divides people into categories of those ‘high up’ and those ‘low 
down’ on the freedom scale (Bauman 1998: 86-87). 
 Surveillance technologies play an important role in this process of risk-
assessment, by providing states with the data that is used to determine the level of risk 
and, consequently, the granted degree of mobility. Due to these technologies, the 
regulation of people’s mobility can be performed, not only at the border, but also 
beyond: movement within states has become increasingly registered, traced and 
tracked, for example, through the use of biomedical data in passports, CCTV-
networks, personalized credit- and public transport cards and the tracking of GPS-
locations of phones (Graham & Wood 2003: 219; Lyon 2002: 136; Lyon 2010). 
Before it is possible to look at the possible implications of the use of such surveillance 
technologies on people’s mobility, however, it is necessary to have a deeper look at 
the concept of surveillance, and how it has developed over time. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The term ‘cumulative disadvantage’ is often used as a perspective on poverty 
processes. It describes how the marginalized groups of a society are often believed to 
become further disadvantaged, as a result of their marginal position. The opposite 
notion, cumulative advantage, refers to how the majority group of a society is often 
found to end up in more comfortable conditions, due to their dominant position within 
society.  
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III. Surveillance & the State 
 
It is important to realize that surveillance –which in its literal translation signifies the 
act of (closely) watching over (someone/something)- is not a new phenomenon. The 
practice has a long history, both in informal, social settings and under more official 
conditions (Lyon 1992: 160; Marx 2002: 17-18). The act of social control, for 
example, could also be understood as a way of conducting surveillance. In the setting 
of a village or a city neighbourhood, information on other people’s behaviour and 
well-being can easily be obtained, exchanged and corrected through the means of 
observance and gossip. In these settings, each person functions as both a disciplinary 
and a safeguarding ‘set of eyes’ (Eriksen 2001 [1995]: 59-60, 75-77). 
 In larger settings, however, surveillance takes other, more official forms. 
While informal surveillance practices are not altogether erased in these settings, large 
places such as cities do provide people with the possibility to act and move in more 
anonymous ways. This has urged states to increase the level of knowledge on their 
people, in order to enhance their ability to monitor and control their population more 
precisely (ibid.: 157-160; Scott 1998: 53-83). The history of political surveillance –
surveillance conducted by governments and/or intelligence agencies- therefore, is 
closely related to the development of the modern state and goes back as far as the 16th 
and 17th century (Marx 2002: 18). In the past few decades, these state surveillance 
practices have taken place in different manners, for example through the 
implementation of the passport system, the requirement of civilian resident 
registration or the use of CCTV-systems in public areas.18  
 Legibility, therefore, is one of the aims that states pursue when conducting 
surveillance. By making their territory more ‘readable’ through the use of such 
practices, states enhance their capacity to manage their population (Scott 1998: 2, 18). 
This kind of control is a necessary element in the constitution of any form of social 
unit, as it is a way through which the unit is identified as being a unit. Surveillance, 
therefore, enables the state with the information that is required to maintain and 
safeguard its own identity as being a state: it constitutes its own ‘state-ness’ (Rule 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 CCTV (Closed Circuit Television) refers to the use of a group of video cameras to 
transmit signals to specific places, such as the placing of video cameras in banks, 
stores or neighbourhoods of a city. 
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1973: 20-21). Therefore, if people deviate from the norms that are being constructed 
as part of a state’s identity –for example by transgressing the speed limit, or by 
committing fraud- surveillance is one of the means through which the state is able to 
detect and correct such violations.  
 But what exactly is surveillance? Traditionally, it has been defined as the act 
of collecting and combing people’s data, and the supervision of their activities (Lyon 
1992: 160). Recent technological and socio-political developments, however, have 
not only changed surveillance itself but also the ways in which states make use of 
surveillance technologies. Therefore, the traditional definition of surveillance is in 
need of some critical reflection. 
 
The New Surveillance 
 
In the past decades, many states have started to increase the role and importance of 
surveillance in their way of governance. This growth in the use of surveillance is 
related to a combination of technological and social-political developments, such as 
the emergence of the Internet, the evolving sphere of information technology, the 
bureaucratic and regulatory character of the Welfare State, the 9/11 attacks and the 
War on Terror (Balkin 2008: 3, 5; Lyon 1992: 168; Marx 2002: 18). The Welfare 
State, for example, has contributed to the establishment and development of official 
databases, which enable states to regulate and implement the rights and benefits of 
their civilians. The Cold War -and more recently the War on Terror- moreover, have 
helped to generate the development of several military information technologies that 
are necessary to conduct such surveillance practices (Balkin 2008: 3, 4n). 
 These various developments have not only led to a quantitative change in the 
state’s practice of surveillance, but have also significantly altered, extended and 
intensified the ways in which states are able to observe their citizens (Bok 1982: 284-
285; Lyon 1992:  159, 168).  Surveillance as a practice has become less difficult, less 
expensive and less visible –or even invisible- to conduct. Moreover, it has become 
easier to conduct without the consent (or knowledge) of the target19, albeit in more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Consent, namely, can and does play a role in surveillance. The acknowledgement 
and acceptance of specific forms of surveillance can be distinguished, for example in 
the use of personified public transport cards or in the acceptance of online privacy 
settings. 
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manipulative and less coercive ways. This ‘new surveillance’, furthermore, can be 
performed from a distance and in a continuous matter, as it has predominantly turned 
into a routine activity and an automated process. The most significant change in the 
practice of surveillance is, however, that the collected data now enables the state to 
obtain information on the past, present and future behaviour of the observed target, 
which makes it possible to use surveillance in a preventative way (Marx 2002: 13-16, 
28-29; Morozov 2011: 150). 
 Surveillance has increasingly become part of people’s daily lives, as David 
Lyon states: ‘surveillance is part of the way we run the world in the twenty-first 
century’.20 Think, for example, of the data that can be obtained from seemingly 
unremarkable registrations: by public transport cards, debit cards and mobile phones. 
Or consider the data collected through the tracing of social media accounts, the 
monitoring of email servers or the history of web-searches. Time has passed and the 
means of surveillance have changed accordingly. Therefore, it is necessary to 
formulate a new definition that incorporates these changes: surveillance as the act of 
gathering, combining and analyzing personal data through ‘the use of technological 
means’ (Marx 2002: 12, my emphasis, CFD).  
 
Being ‘Embraced’ by the State: Acts of Caring or Controlling? 
 
As argued before, state surveillance is often associated with authoritarianism and 
totalitarian states, in which surveillance mainly functions to oppress populations. 
There are other motivations, however, for states to want to regulate, control and 
discipline their societies through the use of surveillance. Torpey (2000), for example, 
makes a distinction between the ways in which states penetrate and embrace 
societies. The former refers to the ways in which states have enhanced their capacity 
to reach into their societies, in order to extract from them what they need. This idea of 
penetration, however, offers a limited understanding of the nature of modern states, as 
it excludes the ways in which states construct and sustain long-term relationships with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Talk by David Lyon, ‘Surveillance Society’, during the Festival del Diritto, in 
Piancenza, Italy, on 28-09-2008. Source: 
www.festivaldeldiritto.it/2008/pdf/interventi/david_lyon.pdf (latest access: 21-10-
2013). 
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their population. While such relationships, Torpey argues, enable states to penetrate 
their population more effectively (ibid.: 56-57). 
 It is the act of embracing that enhances the relationship between people and 
states. The etymology of the concept goes back to the German word ‘erfassen’, which 
can be loosely translated as ‘to grasp’ or ‘to lay hold of” –in the sense of ‘register’ 
(ibid.: 57-58). The concept of erfassen, therefore, can be related to James Scott’s 
concept of ‘legibility’ (Scott 1998: 2), as the state’s embracing efforts enables the 
state to ‘read’ and manage its society more precisely. Or, more specifically, it enables 
states to embrace particular persons more precisely, while excluding others, which 
makes the act of embracing crucial to the production and reproduction of a states’ 
identity. Surveillance and other systems of registration, therefore, can be seen to play 
an important role in states’ efforts to achieve such ‘legibility’, as these systems help to 
embrace and penetrate the Self, while excluding the Other (Torpey 2000: 57-58).  
 The fact that the use of surveillance technologies enables states to extract 
information from their own and other states’ populations -at times even without the 
targets’ awareness or full comprehension of these activities- is one of the key 
elements that explains why people often associate surveillance with state oppression 
and domination. In an earlier study, I have looked at the ways in which the access to 
knowledge creates a hierarchical division between those with and those without 
access to specific knowledge. Those with access, the ‘knowers’, find themselves in an 
advantaged position, as they are able to determine whether, when and how to use or 
act upon such obtained information, while the ‘not-knowers’ are kept in the dark. The 
fact that the ‘knowers’ are able to do so in secret(ive ways), moreover, strengthens 
their position of power even further. In other words, knowledge is power, or rather: 
the access to knowledge is (Fiedeldij Dop 2011: 11-12). Consequently, as the practice 
of surveillance offers the state a means through which it is able to make itself more 
knowledgeable, surveillance should always be understood as a means of power. It 
should not, however, be understood as an inherent means of oppression, as every form 
of power has the potential to be either used and/or abused (Giddens 1985: 37; Lyon 
1992: 166).  
 Surveillance, therefore, can also play a necessary role within non-totalitarian 
states, both as a means of state control and as a way through which social services are 
provided. The increased importance of the use of surveillance in and by democratic 
states, for example, has led the legal scholar Jack Balkin (2008) to announce the 
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emergence of ‘the National Surveillance State’: a state in which the use of 
surveillance should not be seen as oppressive, but rather as a new form of governance. 
 
The National Surveillance State 
  
As argued by Balkin, the National Surveillance State is a new form of government 
that has emerged out of both the Welfare State and the National Security State. The 
Welfare State, namely, has contributed to the implementation of multiple social 
programs, such as pensions and child benefits, which required the registration of 
people’s information. The National Security State, on the other hand, has encouraged 
the development of specific technologies and intelligence institutions that are needed 
to obtain such personal information (ibid.: 5-6). 
 The National Surveillance State should be understood as a specific form of an 
Information State: a form of governance in which data is collected and analyzed in 
order to identify problems, uphold national security, govern populations and deliver 
social services. In a National Surveillance State, such data collection is done through 
the means of surveillance, argues Balkin (ibid.: 5-6). While information states can be 
found in both authoritarian and democratic societies, the way in which they are 
implemented strongly differs. In theory, data collection in democratic information 
states needs to be justified, should not take place in a continuous manner and requires 
the data to be discarded on a regular basis. These conditions imply that the 
government can still be held accountable for its actions in democratic information 
states, as the public has insight into its laws, decisions and data-collection. Within an 
authoritarian information state, the public is mostly unable to hold its government 
accountable to any of the above (ibid.: 17-18). In practice, however, it has become 
clear that democratic states such as the Netherlands and Germany do not always 
comply to these requirements either. The NSA-leaks have revealed how these 
countries have conducted surveillance on a continuous basis, while storing data on 
ungrounded and unclear grounds; and without offering the public any guarantees that 
the data will be fully discarded.21  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 EU-hof: bewaren data mag zo niet. Website NOS, 8-04-2014. Source: 
www.nos.nl/artikel/633382-euhof-bewaren-data-mag-zo-niet.html (latest access: 29-
06-2014). 
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 Surveillance, in other words, can be used in a variety of ways and for a 
multitude of purposes. It has become clear, however, that state’s use of surveillance 
technologies does not affect all people in a society in an equal manner, but leads to 
processes of categorisation. Whether someone is considered to pose a high or a low 
risk to the state’s inner realm, after all, is based on the risk-analyses of data that are 
obtained through the means of surveillance. The categories that follow such risk 
assessments, in other words, have an impact on people’s lives (Graham & Wood 
2003: 222; Lyon 2010: 622-623).22 It is important, therefore, to look how states’ use 
of surveillance technologies (differently) affects people’s degree of mobility. Doing 
so, I will specifically look at the ways in which the EU has equipped its external 
border with a variety of surveillance, monitoring and regulating technologies, and 
how this impacts people’s mobility within and into the European Union. 
 
IV. Surveillance & Mobility at the EU Border: Death, Bodies, Risk and 
Categorisation 
  
When discussing the implications of the intensified use of surveillance at the EU 
external border, the effect that needs to be mentioned before any other, is the strong 
rise in the number of deaths at the border. The most infamous example of this 
development is the Lampedusa migrant shipwreck of 2013, when a small Libyan boat, 
carrying approximately 500 people –including children- caught fire and sank close to 
the Italian island Lampedusa. Only 155 people survived.23 Unfortunately, this was no 
isolated incident: the European border has literally turned into a deadline, or rather, I 
would argue, a deathline (van Houtum & Boedeltje 2009: 228; Jeandesboz 2008: 17). 
 Recent numbers show that, since the beginning of this year, already close to 
42.000 people have tried to reach Italian territory by boat –disregarding those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Talk by David Lyon, ‘Surveillance Society’, during the Festival del Diritto, in 
Piancenza, Italy, on 28-09-2008. Source: 
www.festivaldeldiritto.it/2008/pdf/interventi/david_lyon.pdf (latest access: 21-10-
2013). 
23 Lampedusa shipwreck: Italy to hold state funeral for drowned migrants, the 
Guardian, 9-10-2013. Source: www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/09/lampedusa-
shipwreck-italy-state-funeral-migrants (latest access: 20-6-2014). 
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travelling by boat to countries such as Greece and Spain.24 The crossing is very 
dangerous: even when the overcrowded, ill-equipped boats do manage to survive the 
crossover, the passengers still face high risks of dehydration, sunstrokes and 
hypothermia, while floating on open water for days. These specific crossings, 
however, are not the only ways through which migrants try to enter the EU: some try 
to cross overland, hiding in or under trucks; while others hide in cargo containers that 
are being shipped to European ports. As such travels take days (or even weeks) and 
the containers and trucks are often unventilated and/or overcrowded, many die of 
either suffocation or asphyxiation. Besides all these risks, the migrants also face the 
dangers accompanying human trafficking and smuggling, such as extortion, 
kidnapping and/or sexual and physical abuse. Finally, even after arrival to the EU, 
migrants face strict immigration policies, which have caused an increase in the 
number of suicides amongst people waiting in detention and deportation centres (van 
Houtum & Boedeltje 2009: 228).25  
 At the European border, the use of surveillance technologies is most clear when 
looking at the EU border agency Frontex and the recently implemented EU border 
surveillance system, EUROSUR. Frontex26 has been established in 2005 in order to 
execute the EU’s Frontex Information System. The goal of the agency is to improve 
the coordination of the operational cooperation between the different Member States 
in the management of the EU’s external borders. Doing so, the agency assists the 
Member States in the implementation of these operational aspects and provides them 
with risk analyses on potential threats, which are conducted through a common 
integrated risk analysis model. Moreover, Frontex also provides the Member States –
if necessary- with technical and operational assistance at the external borders, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Europe faces ‘colossal humanitarian catastrophe’ of refugees dying at sea, the 
Guardian, 2-6-2014. Source: www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/02/europe-
refugee-crisis-un-africa-processing-centres (latest access: 20-6-2014). 
25 Demystifying migration: giving a voice to millions. Website United Nations 
Human Rights, 23-10-2013. Source: 
www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DemystifyingMigration.aspx (latest access: 
08-07-2014). 
26 The name Frontex is based on the French words ‘Frontières extérieures’, which 
means ‘external borders’. Officially, the agency is called ‘the European Agency for 
the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member 
States of the European Union’. For more information, see: frontex.europa.eu/about-
frontex/legal-basis (latest access: 06-07-2014). 
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includes the organization of joint return operations of ‘third-country nationals’27 that 
are illegally present in the EU (Jeandesboz 2008: 1-5).28  
 The EU border surveillance system (EUROSUR), moreover, is developed to 
link the geographical border with the ‘digital’ border, in order to create an EU-wide 
exchange network of information sharing and analysis (Bigo et al. 2012: 23; 
Jeandesboz 2011: 5). EUROSUR makes use of coastal radars, satellite tracking 
systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) and autonomously functioning systems to 
target, identify and follow possible illegal crossings, such as the small boats that look 
to arrive at EU territory. The surveillance system, therefore, is meant to enhance the 
‘situational awareness’ of Frontex and its reaction capability to prevent illegal border 
crossings at the EU’s external land, sea and even space borders. In practice, this 
implicates that EUROSUR pushes the Schengen states29 to continuously conduct 
surveillance at those EU borders –both land and sea- that are considered to pose a 
‘high possibility’ of illegal crossings, in order to detect unauthorised migration (Bigo 
et al. 2012: 37). 
 The use of such surveillance technologies for border control purposes can be 
described as a proactive element of the EU’s security strategy. The EU advocates this 
proactivity in the name of the protection of EU’s citizens and –as a response to the 
high deathtoll at the border- for the protection of illegal migrants and other persons in 
need. Surveillance at EU border control, in other words, is justified in terms of 
security and humanitarianism. What is ignored at this point, however, is the fact that 
the use of such technologies does not only potentially save people from dying at the 
border, but also puts those same people increasingly at risk, as the migrants will 
continue to turn to even more dangerous routes (Jeandesboz 2011: 7). The work of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The term ‘Third Country National’ refers to a person who is applying from a visa 
from a country that is not his country of origin, in order to obtain access to a country 
that is not his country of origin either. 
28 European Parliament and the Council of the EU (2004), Regulation (EC) No 
2007/2004, of 26 October 2004, establishing a European Agency for the Management 
of Operational Coordination at the External Borders of the Member States of the 
European Union, OJ L 349/1, 25.11.2004 (hereafter “Frontex Regulation”), Art.11. 
Source: http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/About_Frontex/frontex_regulation_en.pdf 
(latest access: 8-6-2014). 
29 The states belonging to the Schengen Area (almost all EU States and some non-EU 
states) have all agreed to the Schengen Agreement that was implemented in 1995, 
which enables citizens to cross their internal borders without border checks. See for 
more information: ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-
visas/schengen/index_en.htm (latest access: 06-07-2014). 
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Frontex, therefore, could be said to lead to ‘...the displacement of the routes available 
to migrants to areas [that are] even more remote and perilous, [thereby] further 
endangering lives and greatly reducing the possibilities available for those individuals 
seeking protection to do so’ (Jeandesboz 2008: 17). 
  
The Body and the Border 
 
The implementation of EUROSUR is also illustrative for a second change in EU 
border management: the de-location of the border. The adoption of EUROSUR in the 
EU approach towards border control, namely, has encouraged Frontex to expand its 
surveillance missions beyond the geographical borders of the EU, into third countries 
and into the migrants’ country of origin. Surveillance at the border, in other words, 
has come to reach beyond the legal territory of the EU: beyond the external EU border 
(Bigo et al. 2012: 37; Jeandesboz 2011: 4-6).  
 In fact, the use of surveillance technologies has not only made it possible to 
de-locate the border from its geographical roots, but even to re-locate the border onto 
the objects that are being scrutinized: the border crossers themselves. People’s 
movement between and within states has become increasingly registered, traced and 
tracked, amongst others through the use of biomedical data in passports, CCTV-
networks, personalized credit- and public transport cards and the tracking of GPS-
locations of phones (Paasi 2012: 2305-2307; van Houtum 2011: 58). Through the 
scanning, enumerating, objectifying and processing of border crossers, people have 
become the borders themselves, as their moving bodies represent the border that need 
to be managed, registered, controlled and disciplined. The human body, in other 
words, has become the border-crossers’ passport and luggage, even in a literal sense: 
through the use of iris- face-, finger- and body-scans during border checks. The 
human body, therefore, has become the key site of borders in the modern, 
biometrically managed world (Paasi 2012: 2303-2307; van Houtum 2010: 287-288). 
 This change is also made clear in a different case study, which discusses the 
issues of mobility and surveillance at the US-Mexico border. Aguirre Jr. & Simmers 
(2008) have shown, namely, how the location and movement of border crossers from 
Mexico into the USA has come to define where the border exists in the eyes of the 
U.S. public (ibid.: 101-103). They argue that, as the physical border (the border wall) 
is being connected to the movement of Mexican people, the American public has 
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come to believe that their country is being invaded, not only by illegal migrants but 
by the border itself. Consequently, whenever the public is confronted with (Mexican) 
migrants in their country, the illusion of the US-Mexican border is erected in front of 
their eyes. Therefore, Aguirre Jr. & Simmers argue, the border can be said to come to 
travel on the back of the border crossers, situating the border where they go (ibid.: 
103).  
 The use of surveillance technologies at the border, however, has not only 
changed border control in a spatial way. It has also changed European border control 
in a temporal way, as it aims to identify potential threats through the use of risk-
analysis and constant surveillance (Jeandesboz 2011: 3-4). This temporal change is 
one of the most important alterations in the use and functioning of ‘the new 
surveillance’. The data obtained through surveillance, namely, is no longer only used 
to analyse the present or past behaviour of people, but has become an important factor 
in the analysis of people’s hypothetical behaviour in the future (Marx 2002: 15). 
Surveillance, in other words, has turned into a practice of risk management, which has 
become one of the key aspects of the functioning of ‘the smart borders package’ of 
the EU (ibid.: 4,8).  
 
Risk, Categorisation and the Border  
 
In 2008, the European Commission presented the European ‘smart border package’, 
which consists out of the Entry/Exit System (EES) and the Registered Traveller 
Programme (RTP). 30 The main goal of the ‘smart’ borders at the external EU border 
is the enhancement of the efficiency and ease of border control, as stated by the 
European Commission.31 The Entry/Exit System and the Registered Travellers 
Programme, in other words, are predominantly designed to speed-up and modernize 
EU border checks (Bigo et al. 2012: 31-32).  
 The proposal of the Entry/Exit System (EES), which was issued at the 
beginning of 2013, primarily aims to identify overstayers: non-Europeans who have 
entered the EU through legal channels, but who have stayed longer than they were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 ‘Smart Borders’: enhancing mobility and security. Website European Commission, 
28-02-2013. Source: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-
new/news/news/2013/20130228_01_en.htm (latest access: 24-06-2014). 
31 Ibid. 
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legally entitled to do. The Entry/Exit System aims to register the cross-border 
movements of these third-country nationals, in order to ‘...improve the management 
of the external border and the fight against irregular migration...’.32 In doing so, the 
EES would make use of the Biometric Matching System, which centrally stores both 
fingerprints and facial scans of travellers. The Entry/Exit System is meant to 
constitute the first consistent EU-wide record of all the entries and exits of travellers 
to and from the Schengen area (Bigo et al. 2012: 26-27, 30). 
 The second system of the proposed smart border package, the Registered 
Traveller Programme (RTP), is presented as a ‘compensation’ for the longer 
procedures of the planned Entry-Exit System. It is designed to electronically 
distinguish between different border crossers, by looking at the potential risk they 
pose. This degree of risk is considered to be low, according to the European 
Commission, when a person frequently travels to the Schengen Area for legitimate 
reasons (such as work or business), has a reliable travel history (those without an 
overstay-record), has sufficient means of subsistence and/or owns a biometric 
passport. Border crossers that comply with these factors will be labelled by the system 
as so-called ‘bona fide travellers’. Consequently, these entrusted travellers are able to 
cross the border more easily and quickly through the use of automated identity checks 
(ibid.: 31-32). 
 In other words, these systems of identification, surveillance and registration 
are being developed and implemented in order to enhance and facilitate European 
migration policies. There are a few important observations to be made here. First, the 
use of surveillance technologies at the border has an enhancing effect on the political 
and normative process of categorisation. Obviously, categorisation is not a new 
phenomenon: it can also be seen as a means through which the state is able to make 
its territory and population more ‘legible’ (Lyon 2003: 372). Recent technological 
developments, however, have enhanced the state’s capacity to collect, store and 
exchange data. This provides states with more (detailed) data, larger geographical and 
temporal coverage; and, above all, with the possibility to automate these processes of 
categorisation (Lyon 1992: 163, 167-168). Classification is more powerful when 
computer-assisted: it is more efficient, consumes less time and, most importantly, its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council. Website European 
Commission, 28-02-2013. Source: ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/doc_centre/borders/docs/1_en_act_part1_v12.pdf (latest access: 06-07-2014). 
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technological process and the outcome of the statistical analyses are often perceived 
as being flawless and neutral. The fact that they are neither –think of the hierarchies 
that accompany categorisation; and of the generation of false positives and/or false 
negatives in analyses33- does not prevent many governments and institutions to 
(blindly) rely on these systems for advice, support and decision-making (Bigo et al. 
2012: 32; Zarsky 2013: 1508, 1511).  
 Secondly, as stated earlier, these surveillance practices have come to be used 
mainly in a preventative way, categorising people ex ante prosecution (Balkin 2008: 
11). The data that is obtained through the use of these various surveillance systems, 
moreover, is being integrated into a central European database network, which leads 
to the creation of digital ‘profiles’. These profiles are based on automated risk 
analyses, which divide potential border-crossers into categories of safe/dangerous, 
welcome/unwelcome and self/other. The process of in- and exclusion, in other words, 
is being automated, which increases the risk of stigmatizing, discriminatory and racial 
profiling (Borren 2008: 228-229; Graham & Wood 2003: 222; Zarsky 2013: 1513-
1515, 1561-1562).  
 These digital profiles, moreover, have helped to create a reality in which 
people are being perceived and managed in terms of risk, categories and numbers. 
Within this created reality, these predicative profiles have come to be understood as 
being ‘more real’ than the actual person of whom the profile was made: the digital 
version has come to be considered as presenting ‘the truth’ (Bogard 1996: 97). 
Therefore, the use of surveillance technologies at the EU border can be seen to have 
enhanced the process of othering at the border, as the EU has produced ‘its own kind 
of strangers’ (Bauman in Houtum & Pijpers 2007: 298), through the creation of such 
categories of ‘Others’. Most problematic is, however, how people’s life chances are 
being red-lined through these processes of othering and categorisation. After all: once 
identified and appointed to a category, it is difficult to get out (Graham & Wood 
2003: 222). The complex and opaque character of these surveillance systems, namely, 
curtails the possibility for the respective object to obtain any insight into –and 
therefore his/her possibility to fight against- the decision-making process around 
his/her categorisation. The complexity of the computer-programs, in other words, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 False positive: a result that indicates that a given condition is present when it 
actually is not. False negative: a result that indicates that a condition is not present, 
while it actually is.  
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together with the general opaqueness of the technologies at hand, confronts the 
‘Other’ with an invisible border that will prove difficult to demolish (Zarsky 2013: 
1519-1520).34 
 
V. Conclusion: the De-humanized Other & the Gated Community of the EU 
 
The European Union has often been portrayed as a fortress; build with strong and 
high walls to protect its people from the dangers at the other side. It has become clear, 
however, that the EU’s external border does not function in the clear-cut way as this 
metaphor suggests. Instead, the EU should rather be seen as a gated community, in 
which the affluent have comfortably situated themselves behind highly securitized 
walls, granting access to a few, while keeping the majority outside (van Houtum & 
Pijpers 2007). The guards at the borders are only allowed to grant (temporary) access 
to those that are able to meet the specific requirements of community. The mobility of 
all people wanting to enter the territory, therefore, is being strictly managed and 
controlled, amongst others through the use of surveillance technologies (think, for 
example, at the use of cameras, digitalized entrance-passes, secret passwords, scans 
and number plate registration). All these technologies help to enhance and maintain 
the division that is being made between those with, and those with limited or no 
access to the inner realm.   
 The walls of the European Union, likewise, have been intensified through the 
use of a variety of surveillance, registration and monitoring systems. People’s 
mobility is being continuously watched and monitored, as all ‘gate’-crossers face 
extensive and ubiquitous forms of surveillance, both at and beyond the outer-walls. 
However, some -the deviant, the marginal, the ‘Other’- have to succumb to more 
intensive forms of surveillance than others, as they are considered to pose a higher 
risk to the constituted Self of the inner realm. Due to the creation of digitalized 
profiles, people’s degree of mobility has become dependent on the predicative 
analyses of the obtained data. The use of surveillance technologies, therefore, can be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Het Veiligheidscomplex, 2014; Talk by David Lyon, ‘Surveillance Society’, during 
the Festival del Diritto, in Piancenza, Italy, on 28-09-2008. Source: 
www.festivaldeldiritto.it/2008/pdf/interventi/david_lyon.pdf (latest access: 21-10-
2013). 
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seen to have an enhancing effect on the process of othering that takes place at and 
beyond the EU border.  
 The combination between surveillance and the process of othering, however, 
does not only function to de-familiarize the ‘Other’, but can also be said to have a de-
humanizing effect. As the personal data of individuals is turned into collective, digital 
profiles, border-crossers are being turned into measurable, abstract flows of 
information. The process of in- and exclusion at the border, moreover, has come to be 
determined by the use of such digital profiles, which demonstrates how they have 
come to be perceived as more ‘real’ than the actual persons in question. Border-
crossers, therefore, are being locked into the constructed reality of risk-algorithms and 
categories, while their life opportunities are being red-lined in the process.  
 Finally, the increased use of surveillance technologies has the horrifying effect 
of having turned the EU-borderline into a deathline. While trying to circumvent the 
‘multiple eyes’ of the EU’s surveillance systems, thousands of migrants are being 
forced to look for more dangerous routes of crossing, causing many of them to die on 
the way. As a result, the EU declares to increase its surveillance practices even 
further, in order to prevent these border-crossers’ deaths, thereby reinforcing the 
vicious circle of death and despair. The EU-border, in other words, is in dire need of 
some (re-)humanization.  
 
_____ 
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